There's one misconception we hear almost every week: "We're too small for anyone to attack us." The statistics say otherwise. Most cyberattacks today are fully automated, bots scan the internet around the clock and never ask how many employees you have. They're looking for one thing only: an open door.
What attackers are actually looking for
In practice, the most common entry points into a small company's network aren't sophisticated exploits but mundane things: a router with a default password, an RDP port exposed to the internet, outdated firmware on a device nobody has touched in five years. An attacker doesn't need to be a genius. It's enough for you to be the slowest in the herd.
Once they're in, the scenario is predictable: data encryption and a ransom demand, business email theft for fake-invoice fraud, or quietly using your infrastructure to launch further attacks.
Three layers that make the difference
A next-generation firewall. A classic firewall only looks at addresses and ports. Modern solutions (including excellent open-source options like OPNsense) inspect traffic content, recognise applications and block known malicious sources before they ever reach your computers.
An IDS/IPS system. An intrusion detection and prevention system works as an alarm and a security guard in one. The IDS spots suspicious patterns in traffic, say, an attempt to exploit a known vulnerability, and the IPS blocks it in the same instant. For small businesses, this is a level of protection that until recently was reserved for corporations, yet today it fits a reasonable budget.
Network segmentation. Accounting, guests on Wi-Fi and printers don't belong on the same network. If something does happen, segmentation keeps the problem isolated instead of letting it spread across the whole company.
Where to start
You don't have to do everything at once. A sensible order for most companies looks like this: first a security assessment of the current state (it often uncovers things nobody knew existed), then tightening the firewall and closing unnecessarily exposed services, followed by segmentation, and only then the more advanced pieces like IDS/IPS and centralised monitoring.
The good news? Most of the risk disappears with relatively small interventions. The bad news? Someone has to actually do them, before the incident, not after.
If you're not sure where your network stands, a security assessment is the best first step. It costs less than a single day of business downtime. Let alone a ransom payment.